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Only time will tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst,Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, Marcus Opp Oct 09,2017

We characterize optimal contracts in settings where the principal observes informative signals over time about the agent's one-time action. If... Read More

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Only time will tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation