We study third-party data sharing---the sale of consumer data generated as a by-product of ordinary transactions---in a framework with a monopolistic seller, a privately informed consumer, and a third party whose data use imposes privacy costs on the consumer. Our...

Why do banks fund illiquid, informationally sensitive assets with short-term, often demandable debt? We develop a model in which banks' reliance on short-term debt makes their assets more liquid. Because banks monitor and collect information about borrowers, adverse selection makes...

We study how artificial intelligence affects welfare in general equilibrium when production requires both finding and solving problems. Unsolved problems are unexploited opportunities or unmet needs that agents find in a congested sector. Problems are solved in layered hierarchies in...

We study government disclosure of the spatial distribution of climate risk. A regulator decides whether to reveal which region is exposed to disaster risk. Households can insure against the disaster or relocate at a cost. Disclosure induces migration out of...

We study whether investor voice can help address global externalities under fragmented regulation. In our setting, a multinational firm generates externalities across jurisdictions, national regulators face political frictions that can impede corrective regulation, and policy differences create scope for regulatory...

We study how green disclosure shapes portfolios and green investment. Disclosure polarizes shareholders and greenness outcomes: green investors concentrate in green firms and push them to become greener, while brown firms are held by less-green investors and reduce greenness. Because...