Qing Liu, Lucy White , Andrea Buffa Sep 15,2021
Most of the literature on organizational design and incentives assumes public contracting. Yet most real world compensation contracts are private... Read More
Basil Williams , Yaron Leitner Aug 29,2020
We study whether regulators should reveal the models they use to stress test banks. In our setting, revealing leads to... Read More
Ivan Marinovic , Martin Szydlowski Sep 22,2020
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns, such as a bank or... Read More
Efstathios Avdis Oct 08,2020
Long-held intuition dictates that information-based trade is impossible without exogenous noise. Risk seekers can resolve this conundrum. Even though such... Read More
Jing Huang,Jidong Zhou, Zhiguo He Nov 24,2020
Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between... Read More
Benjamin Hebert , Barney Hartman-Glaser Jan 07,2019
We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk... Read More
Brett Green , Vladimir Asriyan William Fuchs Mar 12,2019
We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents' expectations... Read More
Brett Green , William Fuchs , Vladimir Asriyan Nov 05,20190
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a... Read More
Dana Foarta, Vladimir Asriyan Victoria Vanasco Nov 05,20190
This paper explores the incentives of product designers to complexify products, and the resulting implications for overall product quality. In... Read More
luis garicano,luis rayo, William Fuchs Jul 30,2018
We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge- intensive economy in which agents... Read More