Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore Apr 26,2022
We develop a tractable framework to study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal wants to manage the unknown risk... Read More
Qing Liu, Lucy White , Andrea Buffa Sep 15,2021
Most of the literature on organizational design and incentives assumes public contracting. Yet most real world compensation contracts are private... Read More
Basil Williams Yaron Leitner Nov 17,20210
Should regulators reveal the models they use to stress test banks? In our setting, revealing leads to gaming, but secrecy... Read More
Ivan Marinovic , Martin Szydlowski Sep 22,2020
We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns, such as a bank or... Read More
Efstathios Avdis Oct 08,2020
Long-held intuition dictates that information-based trade is impossible without exogenous noise. Risk seekers can resolve this conundrum. Even though such... Read More
Jing Huang,Jidong Zhou, Zhiguo He Nov 24,2020
Open banking facilitates data sharing consented by customers who generate the data, with a regulatory goal of promoting competition between... Read More
Benjamin Hebert , Barney Hartman-Glaser Jan 07,2019
We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk... Read More
Dana Foarta, Vladimir Asriyan Victoria Vanasco Nov 05,20192
We study the joint determination of product quality and complexity in a rational setting. We introduce a novel notion of... Read More
Published: AEJ-Micro, 2021, (), -Brett Green , William Fuchs , Vladimir Asriyan Nov 05,20198
How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a... Read More
Published: Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, (), -Brett Green , Vladimir Asriyan William Fuchs Mar 12,20193
We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents'... Read More
Published: American Economic Review, 2019, (), -