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Block Trade Contracting

christoph frei, Markus Baldauf Joshua Mollner   Jun 12,2024

Working Paper No.00095-02

We study the optimal execution problem in a principal-agent setting. A client contracts to purchase from a dealer. The dealer... Read More

Published: Journal of Financial Economics, 2024, 160(), 103901-

Screening with Securities

Nicolas Figueroa, Nicolas Inostroza   Apr 26,2023

Working Paper No.00097-00

A liquidity-constrained asset owner designs an asset-backed security to raise funds from an informed liquidity supplier. Information insensitive securities reduce... Read More

Information Cascades and Social Learning

Sushil Bikhchandani,omer tamuz,ivo welch, David Hirshleifer   Jul 11,2023

Working Paper No.00104-00

We review the theory of information cascades and social learning. Our goal is to describe in a relatively integrated and... Read More

Optimal Information and Security Design

Anton Tsoy , Nicolas Inostroza   Jul 11,2023

Working Paper No.00105-00

An asset owner designs an asset-backed security and a signal about its value. After privately observing the signal, he sells... Read More

Short-term debt overhang

Kostas Koufopoulos (York), Pavel Zryumov , Giulio Trigilia   Jul 11,2023

Working Paper No.00106-00

We show that short-term debt in a firm’s optimal capital structure reduces investment under asymmetric information. Investors’ interpretation of underinvestment... Read More

Designing Stress Scenarios

Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore   Sep 25,2023

Working Paper No.00074-01

We study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal manages the unknown risk exposures of agents by asking them to... Read More

Designing Stress Scenarios

Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore   Sep 25,2023

Working Paper No.00074-01

We study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal manages the unknown risk exposures of agents by asking them to... Read More

Contracting with a Present-Biased Agent: Sannikov meets Laibson

Alejandro Rivera   Sep 27,2023

Working Paper No.00128-00

This paper develops a methodology to solve dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent features present-biased time preferences and naive... Read More

Providing Incentives with Private Contracts

Qing Liu, Lucy White Andrea Buffa   Nov 18,2022

Working Paper No.00073-01

Agents working together to produce a joint output care about each other’s incentives. Because real world contracts are typically private... Read More

The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts

Benjamin Hebert , Barney Hartman-Glaser   Jan 08,2019

Working Paper No.00049-00

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk... Read More