Selling to Advised Buyers

Andrey Malenko , Anton Tsoy   Dec 14,2016

Working Paper No.00006-00

In many cases, buyers are not fully informed about their valuations and rely on the advice of biased experts. For... Read More

Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks

Patrick Bolton , Martin Oehmke   Dec 14,2016

Working Paper No.00007-00

A theory framework to assess how global, too-big-to-fail banks can be successfully resolved by national regulators. Read More

Contracting on Credit Ratings: Adding Value to Public Information

Christine Parlour , Uday Rajan   Dec 28,2016

Working Paper No.00012-00

We provide a novel interpretation of the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete.... Read More

Alternating-offer Bargaining with the Global Games Information Structure

Anton Tsoy   Dec 28,2016

Working Paper No.00008-00

This paper studies frequent-offer limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria in the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The... Read More

Credit Ratings: Strategic Issuer Disclosure and Optimal Screening

Jonathan Cohn , Günter Strobl Uday Rajan   Dec 28,2016

Working Paper No.00003-00

We study a model in which an issuer can manipulate information obtained by a credit rating agency (CRA) seeking to... Read More

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Creditor Dispersion

Hongda Zhong   Dec 30,2016

Working Paper No.00011-00

Firms often choose to raise capital from multiple creditors even though doing so may lead to inefficient liquidation caused by... Read More

Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values

Brett Green , William Fuchs , Vladimir Asriyan   Jul 06,2018

Working Paper No.00033-00

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated assets owned by privately informed sellers. In the model, a... Read More

Published: American Economic Review, 2017, (), -

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   Jul 08,2018

Working Paper No.00041-00

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14