Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00119-00
This paper considers an optimal contracting problem between an informed risk-averse agent and a principal, when the agent needs to... Read More
Branko Urosevic, Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00120-00
We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with large number of agents. We show that,... Read More
Branko Urosevic, Francesco Sangiorgi , Diego Garcia Aug 02,2023
Working Paper No.00121-00
We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate... Read More
Linda Schilling Aug 03,2023
Working Paper No.00122-00
I present a political-economic theory to explain bailouts for failing firms in the presence of non-voters (foreigners). The governing... Read More
Linda Schilling Aug 03,2023
Working Paper No.00123-00
Policy makers have developed different forms of policy intervention for stopping, or preventing runs on financial firms. This paper... Read More
Michael Woeppel, Jordan Martel Aug 03,2023
Working Paper No.00124-00
We present a model of secured lending in which borrowers and lenders agree to disagree about collateral values. Lenders' beliefs... Read More
Maren Vairo, Piotr Dworczak Aug 11,2023
Working Paper No.00125-00
Financial over-the-counter markets have been traditionally very opaque. Recent regulation promotes transparency in some of these markets by lowering search... Read More
Christian Heyerdahl-Larsen,Howard Kung, Philipp Illeditsch Aug 20,2023
Working Paper No.00126-00
We study a macro-finance model with entrepreneurs who have diverse views about the likelihood that their ideas will lead to... Read More
Gabor Pinter, Semih Uslu Aug 26,2023
Working Paper No.00127-00
In intermediated markets, trading takes time and intermediaries extract rents. We estimate a structural search-and-bargaining model to quantify these trading... Read More
Thomas Philippon, Cecilia Parlatore Sep 25,2023
Working Paper No.00074-01
We study the optimal design of stress scenarios. A principal manages the unknown risk exposures of agents by asking them to... Read More