Prediction markets increasingly list contracts settling on an asset price that holders can move by trading the underlying. We build a model showing that such contracts transfer wealth from prediction-market liquidity traders to manipulators and harm price discovery in the...

We examine the general equilibrium impact of a private currency. If the government is predatory and has a monopoly over money issuance, it issues too
much money, in order to finance excessive public expenditures. In this context, what are the consequences...

Large language models (LLMs) perform well on well-defined tasks, but effective
prompting is challenging when tasks depend on users’ soft traits. We introduce prefer-
ence uncertainty—capturing soft information—into a cheap talk framework (Crawford
and Sobel, 1982) and model the communication of soft traits...

How do countries build a reputation for debt discipline? I develop a continuous-time model in which an impatient government, whose income follows a jump-diffusion process, finances consumption by issuing long-term debt to patient investors. The opportunistic government cannot commit to...

Exchanges increasingly generate revenues from selling transaction data, in addition to their traditional business of matching traders. Given exchanges' market power over their data, this raises questions about the quality and pricing of these data, and exchanges' contribution to market...

We study the liquidity choice of a bank subject to rollover risk and support from a lender of last resort (LLR) and study the consequences for bank stability, funding costs, and liquidity regulation. The liquidity choice balances forgoing profitable yet...