Contracting on Credit Ratings: Adding Value to Public Information

Christine Parlour , Uday Rajan   2016

We provide a novel interpretation of the role of credit ratings when contracts between investors and portfolio managers are incomplete.... Read More

Alternating-offer Bargaining with the Global Games Information Structure

Anton Tsoy   2016

This paper studies frequent-offer limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria in the alternating-offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The... Read More

Credit Ratings: Strategic Issuer Disclosure and Optimal Screening

Jonathan Cohn , Günter Strobl Uday Rajan   2016

We study a model in which an issuer can manipulate information obtained by a credit rating agency (CRA) seeking to... Read More

Dynamic Interventions and Informational Linkages

Steven Grenadier, Yunzhi Hu, Steven Grenadier, Yunzhi Hu, Lin William Cong (叢林)   2016

We model a dynamic economy with strategic complementarity among investors and endogenous government interventions that mitigate coordination failures. We establish... Read More

Rise of Factor Investing: Asset Prices, Informational Efficiency, and Security Design

Douglas Xu, Douglas Xu, Lin William Cong (叢林)   2016

We model financial innovations such as Exchange-Traded Funds, smart beta products, and many index-based vehicles as composite securities that facilitate... Read More

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Creditor Dispersion

Hongda Zhong   2016

Firms often choose to raise capital from multiple creditors even though doing so may lead to inefficient liquidation caused by... Read More

Information and Competition with Symmetry

Pete Kyle,Pete Kyle, Mina Lee   2016

This paper investigates the strategic foundations for rational expectations equilibrium. In the model, risk-averse traders with two signals—private information and... Read More

Information Spillovers in Asset Markets with Correlated Values

Brett Green , William Fuchs Vladimir Asriyan   2016

We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with corre- lated assets owned by privately-informed sellers. In the model,... Read More

Competition for Talent under Performance Manipulation

Ivan Marinovic , Paul Povel   2016

We study the effects of introducing competition for CEOs, assuming that the talent of CEOs is not observable and... Read More

Published: Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2017, 64(1), 1-14

Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge

luis garicano,luis rayo, William Fuchs   2016

We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge- intensive economy in which agents... Read More