Alejandro Rivera, Tak-Yuen Wong, Alejandro Rivera, Tak-Yuen Wong, Dirk Hackbarth Jan 14,2018
Working Paper No.00020-00
This paper studies incentives in a dynamic contracting framework of a levered firm. In particular, the manager selects long-term and... Read More
Peter Kondor , Adam Zawadowski Mar 12,2018
Working Paper No.00031-00
We study a capital reallocation problem in which investors can enter into a new market where they compete with each other... Read More
luis garicano,luis rayo, William Fuchs Jul 30,2018
Working Paper No.00042-09
We study contractual arrangements that support an efficient use of time in a knowledge- intensive economy in which agents... Read More
Briana Chang , Martin Szydlowski Sep 21,2018
Working Paper No.00046-00
We present a model of the market for advice in which advisers have conflicts of interest and compete for... Read More
Brian Waters , Edward Van Wesep Dec 17,2018
Working Paper No.00048-00
We present a general equilibrium model of labor market ows that features a periodic equilibrium in which turnover is high... Read More
Ravi Bansal, Ravi Bansal, Hengjie Ai Jan 06,2017
Working Paper No.00009-00
The paper develops a theory for equity premium around macroeconomic announcements. Stock returns realized around pre-scheduled macroeconomic announcements, such as... Read More
Milton Harris , Christian Opp Marcus Opp Feb 01,2017
Working Paper No.00021-00
We propose a general equilibrium framework to analyze the cross-sectional distribution of credit and its exposure to shocks to the... Read More
Efstathios Avdis, Masahiro Watanabe,Efstathios Avdis, Masahiro Watanabe, Efstathios Avdis Mar 15,2017
Working Paper No.00019-00
We present a financial market with investors who have nested private information. Small perturbations of price informativeness, originating from fat-finger... Read More
Efstathios Avdis Mar 15,2017
Working Paper No.00013-00
In dynamic financial markets the stochastic supply of risky assets has a significant informational role. Contrary to static models, where... Read More
Published: Journal of Financial Economics, 2016, 122(), 568-584Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst,Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst, Marcus Opp Oct 08,2017
Working Paper No.00015-00
We characterize optimal contracts in settings where the principal observes informative signals over time about the agent's one-time action. If... Read More